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I. INTRODUCTION
 In 2003, the Gruter Institute sponsored a conference called Incorporating Biology 
and Neuroscience into the Law School Curriculum.  Just last October, the MacArthur 
Foundation announced a $10 million grant to found the Law and Neuroscience 
Project, the “first systematic effort to bring together the worlds of law and science on 
questions of how courts should deal with recent breakthroughs in neuroscience as 
they relate to matters of assessing guilt, innocence, punishment, bias, truth-telling, 
and other issues.”1 
 Despite the fact that it is, at best, “of mixed reliability,” neuroscientific evidence 
is routinely introduced to argue mitigation during the sentencing phase of death 
penalty cases and, with increasing frequency, in criminal defense.2  Neuroimaging 
techniques—fMRI, PET, EEG and SPECT3—are also used to argue diagnosis and 
causal relation in personal injury cases from toxic torts to medical malpractice, and to 
establish or disestablish mental competency.  Combinations of techniques are 
expected soon to play an increased role throughout law—from lie detection and 
ferreting out hidden bias, to establishing medical causation, guilt, innocence, 
competence, capacity, and more.4
 This is a valuable project, worthy of pursuit.  Yet, although partnerships between 
law and science can be useful, and exposing judges and other legal practitioners to 
the true facts about neuroscience may be the best answer to the concerns I am about 
to express, I want to offer a cautionary note about the current romance with 
neuroscience.  I worry that the importance of advances in neuroscience, at least as 
they relate to behaviors relevant to law, is greatly overstated.  Most of the problems of 
law are not scientific ones, even in the area where neuroscience is most deployed 
today—to measure brain function in order to determine competence or culpability. 
The dividing line between competence and incompetence, or culpability and lack of 
it, is one of human judgment, not scientific determination.  Advances in our 
understanding of the human brain do raise moral and ethical dilemmas—and 
concomitant legal ones—worthy of study.  But the biggest dilemma may be how to 
keep advocates from promoting shoddy science and judges and juries from jumping 
to the conclusions that overheated media draw from the typically limited and 
1. Fact Sheet: About the Law & Neuroscience Project, Res. Networks Newsletter (MacArthur Found., 
Chi., Ill.), Oct. 9, 2007, available at http://www.macfound.org (follow “Newsroom” hyperlink; then 
follow “publications” hyperlink; then check box for “Research Networks & Special Projects”).  The 
grant will be divided among twenty-five universities and three fifteen-member research groups.  The 
project aspires to produce a primer for judges on neuroscience and law as well as create a textbook and 
syllabi for law school courses.    Id.  Funds will also be used to educate “ judges, lawyers, legislators, 
reporters, and opinion leaders” on basic neurolaw issues during weekend retreats.  Id.
2. Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 49 (discussing The 
President’s Council on Bioethics, An Overview of the Impact of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal 
Law, (Sept. 2004) (staff working paper), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/background/
neuroscience_evidence.html)).
3. fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging), PET (positron emission tomography), EEG 
(electroencephalography), and SPECT (single photon emission computed tomography) are methods of 
visualizing brain function by mapping blood f low, electrical impulses, and other brain functions. 
4. See Rosen, supra note 2, at 49.
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qualified hypotheses of neuropsychologists.  These hypotheses are particularly 
overheated when it comes to the issue of gender difference.5  
II. LAW AND BRAIN SCIENCE: A BRIEF HISTORY
 The U.S. legal system has a long history of romance with brain science—often 
junk science.6  The nineteenth century phrenologists maintained that human 
personality could be determined by mapping bumps on the skull, and that various 
brain surfaces were responsible for different characteristics of personality.7  The law 
used phrenology, among other things, to help determine the potential for violence 
and recidivism among criminals.8  Phrenology came into American courts in the 
1840s and remained there for seventy years, eventually being discarded, along with 
voodoo and astrology, as nonsense.9  In the intervening period, many prominent 
figures accepted phrenology and had their heads examined, including Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Oliver Wendell Holmes,10 and three presidents: Tyler, Garfield, and 
Grant.11 
 I am particularly concerned, as a longtime feminist and advocate for women’s 
rights, about the deployment of science to ratify and entrench false or skewed 
assumptions about male/female difference.  For the craniologists, contemporaries of 
the phrenologists, the larger size of men’s skulls and brains demonstrated their greater 
rationality and intelligence. Craniologists denied that women should be educated 
equally with men or allowed to pursue similar goals.  A founder of social psychology 
and student of craniology, Gustave Le Bon, summarized their perspective:
In the most intelligent races, as among the Parisians, there are a large number 
of women whose brains are closer in size to those of gorillas than to the most 
developed male brains.  This inferiority is so obvious that no one can contest 
it for a moment; only its degree is worth discussion.  All psychologists who 
have studied the intelligence of women . . . recognize today that they represent 
5. For those who use the term “sex” to refer to genetically ordained (or biological) traits and “gender” to 
reference environmentally (culturally and socially conditioned) traits, one clear message of the new 
neurology is that the line between them is a spurious one.  See, e.g., Melissa Hines, Brain Gender 
5–6 (2004); Eric R. Kandel, In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind 
(2006).  Brain development—literally the creation of neural pathways which awaken and develop some 
traits but not others—is inf luenced every millisecond by environmental conditions.  The brain, of 
course, is part of and inf luences biological development.  I therefore use the two terms interchangeably. 
6. For a more detailed explanation of how some behavior science is junk science, see generally Paul Ehrlich 
& Marcus W. Feldman, Genes, Environments and Behaviors, 136 Daedalus 5 (2007); Stephen J. Gould, 
Carrie Buck’s Daughter: A Popular, Quasi-scientific Idea Can Be a Powerful Tool for Injustice, Nat. Hist. 
Mag., July–Aug. 2002, at 14. 
7. Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body Structure & Mapping Brain Function: A Historical Approach, 33 Am. J.L. 
& Med. 193, 196 (2007).
8. See id. at 201–02.
9. See id. at 202–04.
10. See id. at 200.
11. Jane M. Orient, Sapira’s Art & Science of Bedside Diagnosis 173 (3d ed. 2005) (1990). 
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the most inferior forms of human evolution and that they are closer to children 
and savages than to an adult, civilized man. They excel in fickleness, 
inconstancy, absence of thought and logic, and incapacity to reason.12
Today we know that, although women’s brains are smaller, they contain roughly as 
many neurons as men’s—some 10 billion of them—just more densely packed.13 
Hence, size is not all that matters.
 The eugenics movement, enamored with misguided notions that persist today 
about the heritability of personality and brain-power, led to the sterilization of 
thousands of women, including that of Carrie Buck.  In Buck v. Bell, Justice Holmes 
endorsed her sterilization, famously writing that “three generations of imbeciles are 
enough.”14  As Stephen Jay Gould has shown, Holmes was factually incorrect in 
believing that either Carrie or her mother were “imbeciles.”15  But he was even more 
mistaken in believing that the varied traits that were believed to indicate mental 
disease, or other behaviors thought to be problematic and deserving of elimination 
from human gene populations, were controlled and passed down by a single heritable 
gene or combination of genes.  Multiple combinations of genes, together with 
virtually limitless variation in neural pathways, mean that with extremely rare 
exceptions, behaviors are not inherited.16  As one columnist noted, “if a trait like 
aggressiveness is influenced by just 100 genes, and each of those genes can be turned 
on or off, then there are a trillion trillion possible combinations of these gene 
states.”17
12. Stephen J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man 104–05 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1981).
13. Hines, supra note 5, at 187.
  [A]lthough the male brain is larger than the female brain, more subtle aspects of brain 
architecture could modify the functional importance of this difference.  For instance, in at 
least some regions of the human brain, neurons are packed more densely in females than in 
males . . . .  [T]he difference in packing density is similar in magnitude to the difference in 
brain size.  Thus, although the male brain may be larger than the female brain, the number 
of neurons, the brain’s primary functional units, may be similar in the two sexes. In 
addition . . . the female brain has a higher percentage of gray matter, greater cortical 
volume, and increased glucose metabolism, thought to ref lect increased functional 
activity.
 Id.
14. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
15. See Gould, supra note 6, at 14. 
16. See Richard J. Haier, Brains, Bias, and Biology: Follow the Data, in Why Aren’t More Women in 
Science? Top Researchers Debate the Evidence 113, 116 (Stephen J. Ceci & Wendy M. Williams 
eds., 2007) (noting that if one identical twin is schizophrenic, the other has only a fifty percent chance 
of sharing the condition, so something other than genetics is at work); Nicholas Wade, Brainpower May 
Lie in Complexity of Synapses, N.Y. Times, June 10, 2008, at F6; Carl Zimmer, Expressing Our 
Individuality, the Way E. Coli Do, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2008, at F1 (deriding genetic determinism by 
pointing out that genetically identical E. coli bacteria exhibit widely varying behavioral traits due to 
environmental conditions and the “noise” of their own proteins, despite possessing only one fifth the 
number of genes as humans and far simpler systems).
17. David Brooks, The Luxurious Growth, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2008, at A19 (citing Jim J. Manzi, 
Undetermined, Nat’l Rev., June 2, 2008, at 26).
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 Scientific pronouncements of gender difference were the foundation of the 
famous decision in Muller v. Oregon, upholding state legislation limiting the number 
of hours women could work.  The Court grounded its decision on two propositions. 
First, the Court stated that a woman’s “physical structure and a proper discharge of 
her maternal functions” required special protection in the public interest (for, as the 
Court put it, “the well-being of the race”).18  Second, the Court said a woman would 
not, when contracting for employment, be able adequately to bargain for herself since 
“there is that in her disposition and habits of life which will operate against a full 
assertion of those rights.”19  The Court’s views were heavily influenced by attorney 
and later Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis’s brief (put together in large measure 
by two female labor activists), which compiled medical opinions from legislative 
hearings throughout the world.  The brief documented the deleterious effects of 
industrialization and their even more negative impact on women, who were “weaker 
than men in all that makes for endurance: in muscular strength, in nervous energy, 
in the powers of persistent attention, and application.”20
 Even when not opining directly on gender difference, scientific claims about 
brain function have been used in ways that are harmful to women.  For example, the 
notion that physical symptoms of brain function could separate liars from truth-
tellers has lead police departments throughout the United States to ignore the claims 
of the largely female victims of rape and domestic violence whenever polygraph 
examiners (the vast majority of them male) choose to interpret measures of blood 
pressure, respiration rate, and electrodermal skin response (or sweat) as signs of 
lying.21  Based in part on the 1983 conclusion of Leonard Saxe, who was commissioned 
by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment to digest existing studies of 
the polygraph, Congress passed legislation forbidding use of the polygraph to screen 
applicants for employment or as the sole basis of employee discipline.22  Saxe 
concluded that there is no “Pinocchio effect”—it is not plausible that a machine that 
measures physiological responses to questions could detect lies.23  Despite this 
legislation, our government, which is exempt from legislative prohibitions on its use, 
has continued to rely (mistakenly, as it appears in more than one recent case) on the 
18. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908).
19. Id.
20. Brief for the State of Oregon at 18, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107). 
21. See Raymond Hernandez, Lie-Detector Tests Are Banned on Victims Alleging Rape, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 
1996, at B5.  New York State banned the practice of giving polygraph tests to rape victims after 
recognizing that “the emotional responses manifested by victims of sexual assault as they relive 
harrowing attacks during polygraph tests commonly result in false conclusions that they are lying.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).
22. See Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (EPPA), 29 U.S.C. § 2002 (2006).
23. See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Scientific Validity of Polygraph 
Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation II (1983).
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polygraph to keep us safe from spies and terrorists.24  Since those who interpret 
polygraph charts are overwhelmingly male, and many, if not most, are current or 
former law enforcement personnel, the gender stereotypes prevalent in that profession 
are all too likely to guide their interpretive leaps.
 But, ever vigilant, our Homeland Security Department is funding research on 
newer and better methods of lie detection, emphasizing particularly the new 
neuroscience.25  The hope is that brain-mapping techniques, such as fMRI, will 
reveal identifiable patterns of brain activity when subjects are lying.26  But the new 
methods are no more likely to be effective than the old.  Like the old, they import 
human gender biases because they require interpretation.  It may be that our anterior 
cingulate cortex and superior frontal gyrus light up when we tell a simple lie under 
experimental conditions, and it may be that the regions lighting up at particular 
questions differ as between males and females in some experiments.  But nothing 
can tell us why or whether those same regions might light up for reasons totally 
independent of lying when confronted with myriad stimuli outside the laboratory, 
much less whether male/female difference in brain processing has any behavioral 
impact.27  Indeed, critics of the research point out that there are numerous different 
types of what we call lies,28 and that it is highly likely that each lie utilizes different 
brain regions and varies by individual.  
24. See Dan Eggen & Shankar Vedantam, Polygraph Results Often in Question, Wash. Post, May 1, 2006, 
at A01 (discussing how Soviet spies Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen evaded detection and citing 
findings by a federal panel of distinguished scientists that in a group of 10,000 government employees 
(with 10 spies), 1600 innocent workers would fail polygraph examinations and 2 spies would pass). 
25. See Robin Marantz Henig, Looking for the Lie, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 47 
(describing federal research incentives aimed at finding a “foolproof technology for deception detection: 
a brain signature of lying”).  Henig points out the challenge if they purport to do so will be to “resist 
pressure to introduce new technologies before they are adequately tested and to fight the overzealous use 
of these technologies in places where they do not belong.”  Id.  While law, with its evidentiary tests and 
reliance on reasoning would seem well positioned to do this, it has shown itself far from immune to the 
vagaries of public opinion and adversarial pressure.
26. See id.
27. See id.; Alexis Madrigal, MRI Lie Detection to Get First Day in Court, Wired Science, Mar. 16, 2009, 
http://blog.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/03/noliemri.html (“We don’t know enough about [fMRI lie 
detection technology’s] accuracy in realistic situations.” (quoting Hank Greely, head of the Center of 
Law and the Biosciences at Stanford)).
28. See id. (discussing the criticism of Harvard psychologist, Steven Kosslyn).  The frontal lobe (working 
memory) might be more active than usual during a spontaneously created lie, just as the right anterior 
frontal cortex (episodic retrieval memory) might be more active during rehearsed lies.  Id.  Both the 
prefrontal cortex (the reasoning part of the brain) and the anterior cingulate cortex (which helps us 
choose between conf licting options) are more active during some lies.  Id.  The roles played by the 
parietal cortex (associated with arousal) and the amygdala (associated with stress and emotion generally) 
are also ambiguous; their excitement may undermine the claim that newer devices test lies rather than 
the anxiety stemming from lying or from the test itself.  Id.
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 Still, waste of government money is nothing new—so what’s the big deal?  For 
feminists, nothing less than a new wave of “separate spheres,”29 or, in today’s 
incarnation, “separate brains.”
III. SCIENCE AND GENDER DIFFERENCE: SEEK, AND YE SHALL FIND IT
 A great deal of the new neurology and related studies of brain development focus, 
quite logically, on gender difference because male and female brains differ in size and 
density, develop somewhat differently, and respond to certain types of hormonal 
stimulation in different ways.30  Furthermore, brain-mapping experiments have 
revealed subtle gender differences in the regions of the brain that respond to certain 
questions or stimuli.31  But, these differences are minuscule when compared to 
average gender difference in, for example, height and muscle size, which are 
themselves relatively small compared to their range within each gender.32 
 Yet, when it comes to gender, the danger of exaggeration, over-claiming, and just 
plain wrong-headedness is acute; perhaps more so when the research is 
well-intentioned.33  Researchers have long noted the tendency of scientists to find the 
results they are seeking.  Because behavioral gender difference is so prevalent in our 
culture and biological gender difference is so visible, the natural tendency is to 
connect the two and look for behavioral difference in biology and neurology.  Yet, 
such connections need to be carefully examined and strenuously challenged because 
they are enormously subject to error.  As long ago as 1974, in their foundational book 
The Psychology of Sex Differences, Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin pointed to four 
29. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1876) (Bradley, J., concurring) (espousing the traditional 
Victorian view on women’s rights).
  [T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the 
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.  Man is, or should be, woman’s 
protector and defender.  The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the 
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.  The constitution of 
the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature 
of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and 
functions of womanhood.
 Id.
30. See generally Hines, supra note 5.
31. Natalie Angier & Kenneth Chang, Gray Matter and Sexes: A Gray Area Scientifically, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
24, 2005, at A1.  The authors relate evidence purporting that female brains have more gray matter (“the 
prized neurons thought to do the bulk of the brain’s thinking”), that male brains have more white matter 
(“the tissue between neurons”), and that the genders use different proportions of gray and white matter 
during problem solving.  Id. 
32. See Hines, supra note 5, at 10. 
33. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 537 n.9 (1996) (discussing three popular nineteenth 
century medical experts’ opinions as to why women should not receive the same education as men); see 
also Deborah Tannen, A Brain of One’s Own: Deborah Tannen on Louann Brizendine’s Provocative Theories 
About the Way Women Think, Wash. Post, Aug. 20, 2006, at BW01 (reviewing Louann Brizendine, 
The Female Brain (2006)) (reporting that a Harvard physician once claimed that women should be 
barred from higher education because “all the blood rushing to their brains would be drained from the 
womb . . . impairing their ability to have children”). 
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dangers of sex research—dangers which persist today.  Two are especially relevant to 
today’s neuroscience f indings. First, they noted that there is signif icant 
over-reporting of difference, or positive results—nineteen findings of little or no 
difference go unreported while there is a screaming headline for the one statistically 
significant finding of difference.34  Second, they argued that the inf luence of 
stereotypes about sex differences on the perceptions of both researchers and 
participants tended to distort results.35  
 One sees these problems operating across the spectrum of media.  Writers—both 
popular and scholarly—want to relate social behaviors to gender (men are from Mars, 
women are from Venus, after all) and to differences in male and female brains.  There 
has been a spate of recent books approaching gender differences from contrasting 
perspectives.36  Louann Brizendine’s overstated and inaccurate The Female Brain 
asserts that “the female brain is so deeply affected by hormones that their influence 
can be said to create a woman’s reality”37 and that there are “sex-specific female brain 
circuits . . . for talking, f lirting, and socializing.”38  Melissa Hines’s more balanced 
Brain Gender offers a descriptive analysis of the research on male/female developmental 
difference, and suggests tentative conclusions about whether and how these differences 
might prove meaningful.39 
 Entire fields—or as noted population scholar Paul Ehrlich would have it, 
“neo-fields”—like that of evolutionary psychology, have sought to show that behaviors 
such as male rape and female nurturing likely have their origins in genetically 
programmed and evolutionarily-driven behaviors.  Their views are taken up by those 
who argue that brain scans will be able not only to predict male violence, but also to 
explain women’s lack of propensity for it.40  Yet, evolutionary psychology is based, as 
Paul Ehrlich and Marcus Feldman demonstrate, on “the misconception that genes 
are somehow determining our everyday behavior and our personalities.”41 
Sophisticated neurologists make clear that environment is operating on neural 
34. See Eleanor Maccoby & Carol Jacklin, The Psychology of Sex Differences: Vol. I/Text 4–5 
(1974).
35. See id. at 7.  Maccoby and Jacklin also cite as dangers of sex research the “situational specificity” of sex 
differences and the disagreement in experimental results when data are obtained in different ways.  See 
id. at 165.  The problems outlined by Maccoby and Jacklin still persist.  See Hines, supra note 5, at 5. 
36. See, e.g., Deborah Blum, Sex on the Brain: The Biological Differences Between Men & 
Women (1998); Brizendine, supra note 33; John Gray, Men are from Mars, Women are from 
Venus (HarperCollins 1992); Ann Moir & David Jessel, Brain Sex: The Real Difference 
Between Men & Women (1989).
37. Brizendine, supra note 33, at 3.
38. Id. at 36.
39. See Hines, supra note 5.
40. See generally Ehrlich & Feldman, supra note 6.  
41. Id. at 5.
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pathways every millisecond and that those pathways are in no way predetermined or 
uniform within a gender.42
IV. LAW, GENDER, AND THE DANGER OF SCIENTIFIC MISREPRESENTATION
 Ehrlich and Feldman point to erroneous conclusions drawn by scientists, as well 
as by science media writers, about heritability of conditions affecting the brain.  But, 
the danger of error when these and newer theories based on neurological data are 
deployed in the legal arena is far greater than that of mere media hype.  Lawyers 
seize upon scientific hypotheses as if they are facts, and judges are reluctant to exclude 
neuroscience experts even when the issue is one unrelated to mental capacity (for 
which brain imaging might provide valid evidence).43  Juries are generally 
ill-equipped, even with the help of opposing experts, to weigh the validity of scientific 
claims,44 and neuroscience evidence has been shown to be quite persuasive irrespective 
of its relevance to an argument or an argument’s quality.45  Jury experts, who study 
the cultural myths to which juries tend to turn when evidence is complex, confirm 
that one of the richest and deepest sources of myth is that of gender difference.46  
 Moreover, because the nature of legal inquiry differs so sharply from that of 
science, erroneous findings that have not been subject to sufficient scientific 
examination are likely to sway decision-making.  As Columbia University Law 
Professor Patricia Williams has noted, the aims of science and law are quite 
different:
Scientists hold themselves open to a wide, sometimes endless range of 
variables that might contribute to cause and effect, right down to the clichéd 
f lapping of butterf ly wings in the Amazon causing storms in British 
42. See, e.g., Kandel, supra note 5, at 109–10 (noting that each human brain has “about 100 billion neurons 
each with about 100 thousand synapses . . . or 1 quadrillion synaptic connections”).  Each synapse 
contains about one thousand different proteins, and these, in turn, operate within smaller units of 
proteins, varied in composition.  Each of these synapses has evolved into a highly complex mechanism, 
and each such mechanism is inf luenced each millisecond by environmental inputs which affect and alter 
its functioning.
43. In cases in which mental illness or brain injury is claimed, fMRI can support behavioral evidence by 
showing that regions of the brain have been injured or are entirely non-functional.  One court has even 
held that the exclusion of imaging evidence from a PET-scan in a capital sentencing case is reversible 
error.  See Hoskins v. Florida, 735 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1999) (per curiam).  
44. Because they see the “battle of the experts” as more likely to confuse than to enlighten fact-finders, the 
Australians have been experimenting with “hot-tubbing,” a system by which experts speak with one 
another at the direction of the court, and the attorneys remain silent.  Adam Liptak, In U.S., Expert 
Witnesses Are Partisan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 2008, at A1.  While this might well be an improvement on 
the current U.S. system, there remains the problem of the overall seductiveness of neuroscientific 
explanation.  
45. See Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. of Cognitive 
Neuroscience 470, 475–77 (2008) (showing that neuroscience evidence interferes with the ability to 
judge the quality of explanations for everyone but experts in the field).
46. See generally Nancy S. Marder, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 Yale L.J. 593 (1987) 
(describing numerous ways jurors’ individual gender and gender stereotypes may affect the outcome of a 
trial).
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Columbia.  Truth to lawyers, on the other hand, is a “due” process, an 
obligatory series of steps that re-enact or recapture an event that occurred in 
another time and place.  Its goal is closure, rather than eternal exploration.47
 In other words, a group of scientists may announce a finding and propose a 
hypothesis to explain it, but thousands of other scientists throughout the world will 
question, challenge, and re-evaluate it before accepting it as valid.  But law—whose 
business is to resolve particular and concrete problems—seizes upon those findings, 
however tentative, to justify a particular and concrete outcome in a particular case or 
controversy, often distorting the science in the process.  
 When it comes to gender, lay readers, media, and scientists themselves share a 
propensity to misread or erroneously extrapolate differences from the data.  Take, for 
example, the swirl of controversy a few years back after Larry Summers, then 
president of Harvard,48 suggested that the dearth of women in math and science 
might be due in part to women’s lesser aptitude for math and science.49  In response, 
the American Psychological Association published a volume of essays entitled Why 
Aren’t More Women in Science, to present the data on gender difference in science, and 
its interpretation by “top researchers on gender difference in cognition in the United 
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.”50  Although contributors were selected 
because their “scholarship in this area is well known, respected and evidence-based,” 
and despite their reliance on “the same or similar data,” the inferences they drew 
from it lead them to rather different conclusions about the degree and importance of 
gender difference.51
 The contributors agree that the evidence to date is clear that males and females 
have, on average, equally strong math and verbal skills, although at the extreme ends 
of the ability curve, as measured by a variety of tests, males seem to have a superior, 
although dwindling, lead in math while women show a small verbal advantage.52 
Males, although they more heavily populate the very bottom of the math ability 
curve, also are more prevalent at the upper end of the curve, and are at all levels 
significantly better than women at the mental rotation of objects in space.53  Many, 
like Summers, see this data as demonstrating that the dearth of women in tenured 
47. Patricia J. Williams, Divining Demeanor, The Nation, June 25, 2007, at 10.
48. Lawrence Summers was appointed as the director of the National Economic Council by Barack Obama. 
Jonathan Weisman, Geithner, Summers to Take the Lead on New Economic Team, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 
2008, at A4.
49. See Angier & Chang, supra note 31 (explaining how Summers anecdotally supported his theory that 
women might shy away from science because it appears too cold and impersonal by stating that his 
young daughter treated her toy trucks as dolls, calling them “Daddy truck” and “baby truck”); Sam 
Dillon, Harvard Chief Defends His Talk on Women, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2005, at A16.
50. Stephen J. Ceci & Wendy M. Williams, Introduction: Striving for Perspective in the Debate on Women in 
Science, in Why Aren’t More Women in Science? Top Researchers Debate the Evidence, supra 
note 16, at 3, 4.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 11–13.
53. See id. at 13.
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positions in science, technology, engineering, and math (the so-called “STEM” 
fields) reflects the outcome of natural selection based on innate ability.54
 Suppose we are jurors trying to assess, for purposes of a tenure case, whether or 
not the dearth of women (or grants given to women) in a given math or science 
department (or the smaller labs or offices) is evidence of discrimination—what should 
we make of data of this sort?  Does it mean that because universities pick top scholars 
and males score significantly higher at the extremes of math curves (which is essential 
to sciences like physics and fields like engineering and technology), males are more 
likely to be qualified and therefore hired, as well as being more likely to succeed?  Or 
might it be that false assumptions about women’s commitments to the workforce or 
capacity for abstract reasoning, together with narrow views about the ingredients of 
success and the long-documented tendency of those doing the hiring to favor those 
more like themselves, have operated to exclude women?
 Will the arguments of those who, like physicist Howard Georgi, emphasize the 
impossibility of correlating success to any particular ability or quality (let alone race 
or gender), be able to trump the “hard data” of graphs, statistics, and pie charts?55 
Will his reminder that “talent can be developed and enhanced by education, 
encouragement, self-confidence and hard work”56 seem convincing in the face of 
colorful neuroscience brain images purporting to establish that while problem-
solving, male brains light up in regions believed related to those where reasoning 
takes place, whereas women’s brains show greater activity in regions associated with 
feeling and emotion?57
54. See Dillon, supra note 49.  In addition, Summers alluded to social and environmental causes of gender 
differences, such as the greater willingness of males to forgo a role in nurturing and family to “get 
ahead.”  See id.
55. See Howard Georgi, Talent, Skills in Math and Science Hard to Quantify, The Harv. Crimson, Jan. 21, 
2005, available at http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=505377.  Georgi reminded Harvard 
undergraduates:
  1. Talent is not a unitary thing, [but] multidimensional and difficult to measure . . . .
  2. Many different kinds of talents are critical to the advancement of . . . any . . . science 
interesting enough to be worth doing. 
  3. The spread of talents within any group, sex, race, etc., is very large compared to any 
small average differences that may exist between such groups. 
  4. Talent can be developed and enhanced by education, encouragement, self-confidence 
and hard work.
 Id.
56. Id.
57. See Margaret Talbot, Duped: Can Brain Scans Uncover Lies?, The New Yorker, July 2, 2007, at 52. 
Talbot, in reviewing the data purporting to claim that fMRI can successfully detect liars, writes that 
despite the few, small, peer-reviewed studies of fMRIs and lie detection, “the idea has inspired a torrent 
of media attention, because scientific studies involving brain scans dazzle people.”  Id.  Talbot goes on 
to give several examples of grandiose extrapolations from the extremely limited data, quoting Stanford 
Law School professor Hank Greely, that “[w]hen we make speculative leaps like these . . . it increases, 
sometimes in detrimental ways, the belief that the technology works.”  Id.  She goes on to note that 
“[o]ne can easily imagine judges being impressed by these pixellated images, which appear so often in 
scientific journals and in the newspaper.”  Id.  See generally Ruben C. Gur & Raquel E. Gur, Neural 
Substrates for Sex Differences in Cognition, in Why Aren’t More Women in Science? Top Researchers 
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 A good deal of data suggest that math and science ability, at least as measured by 
standardized testing, is at least as influenced by nurture as nature, and that gender 
differences in test outcomes within a culture are far smaller than the effects of culture 
and learning.  On international math tests since the 1960s, girls from Japan have 
been outperforming American boys by substantial margins, and recently Singaporean 
girls have been outperforming both.  An International Report for 2002–2003 
suggested a 2 to 5 point higher score for males than for females in both Japan and the 
United States, but a 62 point advantage for Japanese girls over American boys and a 
104 point advantage for Singaporean girls.58  In 2006, American students posted 
math scores lower than the average in twenty-three other countries,59 and science 
scores lower than those in sixteen other countries.60  Yet the tendency to emphasize 
innate gender difference in ability and aptitude as explaining differences in women’s 
absence from certain fields (and even greater absence from top positions in most 
fields) remains overwhelming.  
V. THE SEDUCTIVENESS OF NEUROSCIENCE
 Studies have confirmed that neuroscience explanations are particularly persuasive 
to those outside the field, and hence likely to be subject to misuse.61  It will be 
extremely difficult for judges and jurors to resist the temptation to use those that 
purport to demonstrate gender difference in brain function from confirming 
preexisting stereotypes about men and women.  If reputable scientists and 
psychologists draw unwarranted conclusions about male and female ability and 
aptitude, how much more likely is it that others will take their opinions (which 
ref lect, even if they do not accurately explain, everyday observation) as gospel, 
especially when buttressed by colorful charts revealing brain activity that seems to 
differ by gender?62  Indeed, despite neuroscience’s relative infancy and inability to 
explain human behavior, legal practitioners seem eager to embrace and run with it.63 
Debate the Evidence, supra note 16, at 189, 194–95 (discussing how blood f lows in the brain differ 
during various tasks between the sexes).
58. Ina V.S. Mullis et al., TIMSS 2003 International Report on Achievement in the 
Mathematics Cognitive Domains: Findings from a Developmental Project 12 (2005).  
59. Stephane Baldi et al., Highlights From PISA 2006: Performance of U.S. 15-Year-Old 
Students in Science and Mathematics Literacy in an International Context II (2007).
60. Id. at 5.
61. Weisberg et al., supra note 45, at 475–77 (showing that neuroscience evidence interferes with the ability 
to judge the quality of explanations for everyone but experts in the field).
62. See Leonid Rozenblit & Frank Keil, The Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science: An Illusion of Explanatory 
Depth, 26 Cognitive Science 521, 522 (2002) (stating that “knowledge of complex causal relations is 
particularly susceptible to illusions of understanding”).
63. See, e.g., Stephen Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 397 (2006) (reviewing state of neuroimaging technology and pointing out its 
weaknesses); see also Benedict Carey, Searching for the Person in the Brain, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 2006, § 4, 
at 1 (quoting Dr. J. Anthony Movshon, director of the Center for Neural Science at New York University, 
about how neuroimaging technology has been disappointing inasmuch as it “has told us nothing more 
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Moreover, when judgments are made within a culture that believes deeply that 
everyday differences in the behavior of men and women reflect a deep gender divide 
(Mars versus Venus) and are reinforced by the hyperbole of science writers, like 
Ronald Kotulak of the Chicago Tribune,64 and popular writers like Brizendine,65 the 
gains of feminism are in danger.
 It is easy to demonstrate differences in typical or average male/female brain 
development and physiology.  Our hormones surge at different times and in different 
amounts (indeed, development of male and female sex characteristics and behaviors 
is, at least in rats, heavily hormone dependent).  Our bodies and brains develop 
differently as a result, and maps of brain activity reflect different patterns between 
male and female human test subjects when certain simple tasks are performed, images 
are viewed, or questions are asked.66  But, before we jump to any quick conclusions 
about male/female brain difference, we would do well to remember that, in virtually 
every study to date, the differences demonstrated within each gender are far greater 
than those demonstrated between genders, popular wisdom notwithstanding.  The 
fact that developmental differences exist does not mean that they produce significantly 
different performance outcomes.  It certainly does not mean that different outcomes—
differences, for example, between the presence of males and females in computer 
science—are driven by innate gender-based differences, neurological or otherwise.
 The daily findings of neuroscience are enormously exciting.  We are learning 
that not only does the brain begin the process of adapting to environmental inputs in 
the womb, but that very early education alters brain wiring and makes strong 
imprints.  For example, young musical performers develop enlarged brain regions for 
the limbs they perform with that are gigantic compared to the same region in the 
rest of us.67  Taxi drivers develop larger hippocampi, the brain region correlated with 
spatial representation (and learning routes), but recent research suggests that with the 
increased gray matter came a lessened ability to learn new routes.68  We are 
than what a neurologist of the mid-20th century could have told you about brain functions and where 
they’re localized”).  
64. See Ronald Kotulak, Gender and the Brain; New Evidence Shows How Hormones Wire the Minds of Men 
and Women to See the World Differently, Chi. Trib., Apr. 30, 1996, at C1 (noting that scientists are 
“getting a lot closer to understanding what makes [male and female] brains so different” and why men 
and women “think differently”). 
65. See Brizendine, supra note 33.
66. As my friend Chris Stone, a criminal defense attorney, opined when guest lecturing in my evidence 
class: it is well known among attorneys that “whoever has the biggest exhibit wins.”  The same might be 
said about the most attractive scientific-looking images. 
67. See generally Oliver Sacks, Musicophilia: Tales of Music and the Brain 100–01 (2008) (citing 
2003 research by Harvard’s Gottfried Schlaug and colleagues).
68. See Diane F. Halpern, Science, Sex, and Good Sense: Why Women Are Underrepresented in Some Areas of 
Science and Math, in Why Aren’t More Women in Science? Top Researchers Debate the 
Evidence, supra note 16, at 121, 127 (pointing to data showing, for example, that areas of the brain 
related to spatial skills were enlarged in London cab drivers); Eleanor A. Maguire et al., London Taxi 
Drivers and Bus Drivers: A Structural MRI and Neuropsychological Analysis, 16 Hippocampus 1091, 1099 
(2006).
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continuously seeing just how miraculous the brain’s ability is; it can repair malfunctions 
and adapt to necessity by redeploying regions dedicated to one type of function to 
another type of function.  We are learning, above all, how very complex the brain is, 
and how remote the possibility is that we can predict or understand human behavior 
by exploring and measuring the brain’s individual parts or their separate responses to 
stimuli.
VI. CONCLUSION
 The study of neuroscience is not only exciting, but enormously valuable.  It has 
already taught us that the path to justice lies in ensuring that all young brains receive 
adequate stimulation—stimulation sufficient to fully develop all regions and 
capacities—and protection from experiences that stunt or harm that capacity, to the 
maximum extent feasible.  What neuroscience can not offer, however, is the 
explanations for the multiplicity of behavioral problems and conf licts that have 
generated, and continue to fuel, the engines of law—especially when they involve 
questions of gender.  We can surely find neurological differences between any two or 
more groups we measure.  But, to find structural or physiological response differences 
is not to explain behavioral differences, nor to affix responsibility for those differences. 
Legal practitioners would do better to turn to science for clarification of the 
questions.
 In the end, law is about justice rather than truth.  That is why justice is as much 
concerned with burdens of proof as with proof itself.  When it comes to gender 
justice, the burden must remain with those who would explain behavioral or societal 
gender differences in terms of biology or innate qualities rather than historical and 
cultural factors.  The neuroscientific contribution to carrying that burden is, so far, 
minimal.  But, the hype surrounding its purported findings is not.  I hope that law 
will carefully distinguish the reality from the hype, and I write simply to urge that it 
do so. 
 The honorary chair of the MacArthur Foundation’s Law and Neuroscience 
Project is former Supreme Court Justice, Sandra Day O’Connor.  Ever cautious, 
Justice O’Connor once wrote, “[w]hen gender distinctiveness becomes a mantra, I 
worry that, in our voyage from the eighteenth century to the present, we have not 
really traveled very far at all.”69  Hopefully, her prestige and influence will ensure 
that, when it comes to gender, legal practitioners will not follow the popular press by 
misinterpreting neuroscience to reinforce questionable gender stereotypes, but will 
instead approach such claims with caution and skepticism.  If it is otherwise, the 
claims of neuroscience may one day join those of the phrenologists and craniologists, 
under the label of “ junk science.”
69. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice 
167 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003).
